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S

ince 2011, there has been widespread use of explosive weapons—including conventional weapons, improvised explosive devices (IEDs), and landmines—by all sides in the Syrian conflict.1 As is
known from other contexts, a proportion of these either fail to detonate, becoming unexploded
ordnance (UXO), or are abandoned by combatants to become abandoned explosive ordnance (AXO). 2
Long after conflicts have ended, these explosive remnants of war (ERW) endure as multi-generational
threats to a community’s population and future development.3
One of the first major challenges of dealing

communities. So far, The Carter Center has

The study aims to complement exist-

with the physical threat of ERW is assessing

published four reports on southern Syria,

ing data, data-management tools, and soft-

levels of explosive contamination in a given

areas around Damascus, northwest Syria, and

ware, such as ArcGIS, Google Earth, the

area. A vital aspect of this is conducting

northeast Syria. It has extrapolated 267,267

Information Management System for Mine

physical visits to field locations for a variety

uses of explosive munitions in 2,485 commu-

Action (IMSMA), or Power BI. The study will

of activities, such as interviews and surveys.

nities from 63,344 reported conflict events.7

be readily available in Excel/CVS file format

However, in places like Syria, this is not

A final report summarizing the whole of

for HMA actors to utilize for their own pur-

always possible due to insufficient access and

the country, including central Syria, will be

poses, compare with their own datasets,12

other security, political, and financial con-

released by the summer of 2021.

and temporarily fill gaps in understanding.

straints. Adapting to these challenges, many

Not only does this desk assessment con-

The study would effectively augment verified

humanitarian mine action (HMA) organiza-

tribute to the existing body of information on

data until this type of data can be collected

tions turn to desk-based, data-driven activi-

explosive weapons used in the Syrian conflict,

or released, or until an on-the-ground assess-

ties, such as non-technical surveys (NTS)

it also provides a new tool at the operational

ment can be conducted.

or impact surveys, as a means to prepare for

level to assist with initial planning and priori-

At the strategic level, the granularity pro-

when conditions become available for con-

tizing actions on the ground. For example, the

vided by this type of study can give political

ducting operations on the ground.

findings can infer the likely location8 and gen-

and donor entities a better understanding of

In 2019, The Carter Center found an

9

eral category of potential explosive hazards.

the scale and complexity of the issue of explo-

opportunity to engage productively via the

This can act as a basic risk assessment tool for

sive weapons contamination in Syria. This is

Explosive Munitions Use in Syria Project.5

anyone seeking to travel to an area,10 especially

especially true if the data from Syria is com-

Using its unique, open-source conflict data-

HMA personnel. The study could also be used

pared to other environments where explo-

set and an innovative method that counts

as a roadmap to help prioritize various tasks

sive hazards clearance has taken place. The

the number and general category of explosive

within HMA, including risk education (RE)

aims of the project firmly align it within key

munitions mentioned within a conflict event,6

activities and NTS, especially if other verified

frameworks used in the HMA sector, namely

it began analyzing and mapping informa-

data is unavailable or verified data is slow to

the five pillars of mine action and the UN’s

tion about explosive weapons use in Syrian

materialize.

Sustainable Development Goals.13

4
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Comments
3 x airstrikes at around 20:30, resulting in no casualties
10 x artillery bombardment at around 12:30, resulting in no casualties
Unique ID

Incident Type

Initiator

Target

Governorate

1

Aerial Bombardment

NA

NA

Idleb

2

Shelling

NA

NA

Idleb

District

SubDistrict

Ma’rrat an Nu’man Khan Shavkun
Jisr-Ash-Shugur

Badama

Town/Village

Neighborhood

Point of Interest

Latitude

Longitude

Comments

Total Killed

Units Displayed

Source

URL

Hobit

NA

NA

35.4395

36.536

3 x airstrikes at around 20:30, resulting in no casualties.

NA

NA

Carter Center

Carter Center

11/29/2016

Maraand

NA

NA

35.7776

36.224

10 x artillery bombardment at around 12:30, resulting in no casualties

NA

NA

Carter Center

Carter Center

05/10/2016

Date

Figure 1. Two example rows of data used in The Carter Center’s Explosive Munitions Use in Syria Project.
Figure courtesy of Jonathan Robinson.

The Data and Method
One dataset that is particularly insightful

events and the number of explosive munitions

Despite its limitations,18 the study nonethe-

for HMA organizations conducting desk-

used in those conflict events grows consider-

less provides a useful starting point, identify-

based assessments is verified conflict data,14

ably. The result is a significant discrepancy

ing a minimum count or baseline of explosive

which is typically person-confirmed, known-

in the understanding of explosive munitions

munitions used in a given area, from a dataset

to-be-true information that details the type

used in a given context.

not typically employed in HMA. The data is

of conflict an area has experienced, the

The Carter Center’s project aims to rectify

divided into four groupings of air-launched

ammunition used, and the intensity of the

this limitation. Between 2013 and the present

munitions (excluding cluster munitions),

fighting there.

day, it has collected over 200,000 corrobo-

ground-launched munitions (excluding clus-

While useful, verified conflict data has

rated conflict events from a variety of open-

ter munitions), air and ground cluster muni-

limitations if used exclusively. A sizable

source outlets, including Syrian Observatory

tions, and landmine/IED/UXO. Within each

amount of other types of data may be dis-

for Human Rights (SOHR), Syria Live Map,

of these groupings, more details of the explo-

counted at times, especially open-source

and the Armed Conflict and Location & Event

sive munitions used are given, such as barrel

datasets and social media that have perceived

Data Project (ACLED) data, as well as a small

bombing, artillery shelling, or mortar shell-

accuracy or trust limitations, as the source of

number of verified reports from the ground.16

ing, and thus can highlight the general type of

the information is not always clear or veri-

To the authors’ knowledge, this data had not

hazards potentially in an area.19 Rather than

fied. Moreover, the process of verifying or

been systematically analyzed for use in the

it being viewed as an exact type or number

confirming data is time consuming to do

HMA sector until now.

of explosive munitions used in an area, this

and sensitive to release in situations where

Using this data, one of the authors devel-

baseline count should be seen as providing a

conflict persists. In addition, the way cur-

oped and applied a simple method to extrap-

more detailed picture about the distribution

rent conflict data is recorded and visualized

olate the number of explosive munitions

of explosive munitions over an area (Figure

is limited; often focusing on the events them-

mentioned within a conflict event. In cases

2). The method does not attempt to replace

selves, rather than the information contained

where numbers of explosive munition uses

verified datasets or HMA activities, but rather

within them, which can show key details

were mentioned, these were counted (e.g., an

seeks to augment those efforts until condi-

about the number of explosive munitions in

airstrike, two barrel bombs, three airstrikes).

tions become conducive to such activities or

an event.15 This approach can lead to signifi-

However in cases where the number of explo-

receive such data.

cant discrepancies in how explosive weapons

sive munitions were not explicitly mentioned

use in an area is understood.

(e.g.,

shelling,

several

air-

Taking two real examples from The Carter

strikes, etc.), they were given

Center’s Explosive Munitions Use in Syria

a minimum count of three.

Project, Conflict Event A records “three air-

This is because single and dou-

strikes” in Hobit town, while Conflict Event

ble uses of explosive munitions

B records “ten artillery bombardments” in

were typically mentioned in the

Maraand town (Figure 1). In the current sys-

data, and so the most accurate

tem used by many HMA actors, the two con-

but conservative guess for plu-

flict events would be analyzed and visualized

ral explosive munitions uses

in the same way: as two single-conflict events.

after this is three. This rule was

However, there is obviously a significant dif-

used even if adjectives such as

ference in the number of explosive munitions

“intense” or “heavy” preceded

mentioned in these two conflict events. Over

the explosive munitions type

time, and with a dataset of thousands of con-

in the conflict event (e.g., heavy

flict events, the gulf between the number of

shelling or intense airstrikes).17

Village Cluster
Conflict Events

Village Cluster
Munition Count

Figure 2. Current method of mapping conflict events by
counting conflict events (left), and the Explosive Munitions
Use in Syria Project’s method of counting explosive
munitions mentioned within conflict events provides a
more detailed picture of the distribution of explosive
munitions in a given area (right).
Figure courtesy of Jonathan Robinson.
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Figure 3. Map of
explosive munition uses
in southern Syria from
The Carter Center’s
Explosive Munitions
Use in Syria Project. 22
Figure courtesy of
The Carter Center.

The Technical Tool
The potential of the project is wide-ranging

At the strategic level, the study can aid

in communities identified in southern Syria,

and is already supported by some in the HMA

political and funding advocacy efforts by bet-

areas around Damascus, northwest Syria, and

community.20 At the operational level, the

ter highlighting the scale and complexity of

northeast Syria.24 Although it would not pro-

project functions as a basic risk assessment

the issue as well as an estimation of the signifi-

vide an exact dollar amount or hours needed

tool for initial planning stages and prioritiz-

cant resources required. For example, if a per-

for the clearance of UXO in Syria, compara-

ing HMA activities for actors traveling to a

centage of between 10 percent and 30 percent 23

tive analysis of estimated contamination

potentially contaminated area.21 Another use

is given as the number of items that failed to

levels, clearance rates, and the geographical

could be to help initially plan NTS and RE

detonate and applied to the 267,267 explosive

size of contaminated areas with regions such

activities in a more systematic way, given that

munitions used in The Carter Center’s stud-

as Iraq or Mozambique25 could go some way

the findings cover the distribution of explo-

ies so far, this suggests that between 26,727

to creating a tangible reference into what is

sive munitions across Syria (Figure 3).

and 80,180 explosive munitions are present

minimally required to deal with the UXO

Wider Applications and Future Outlook
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Looking to the future, while the current

open-source data to strengthen the inference

study is applied to Syria, its methodology eas-

of explosive weapons use and potential con-

ily lends itself to other environments where

tamination, including other open-source con-

HMA activity is needed or conducted, given

flict datasets, open-source data on explosive

that this type of project only requires open-

munitions clearance, satellite imagery detail-

source conflict data as an input.27 Not only

ing explosive munitions damage, weather

this, other information could supplement the

conditions during the events, information
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problem in Syria.26

on how long communities remained under
the control of an armed group, or the time a
community spent close to a frontline to name
a few (Figure 4).
Artificial intelligence (AI) and machine
learning (ML) could also be used to extract
information about explosive munition uses

from visual (video and photo) or text media

Carter Center Data

from a wide range of sources, including social
media tools like Twitter or Facebook. AI and

Other Open Source Datasets

ML would also improve the speed and efficiency of the project; instead of manually

Clearance Data

extrapolating the explosive munition counts
from each conflict event, it could be done

Satellite Damage Assessments

automatically.
The additional layers of information mentioned previously are by no means exhaustive,
but could result in unprecedented findings
on the validity and utility of open-source
data and its usefulness in the HMA sector.
As mentioned previously, rather than replace
existing methods and systems in the HMA

More Accurate Inference of UXO Contamination
Figure 4. Different layers of data that could improve the results of the Explosive
Munitions Use in Syria Project.
Figure courtesy of Jonathan Robinson.

sector, the study would seek to augment these

sector, HMA and open-source data studies

open-source data studies could then be used

in cases where conditions are not available for

can be used as an entry point for conven-

to build discussions on wider topics, such as

HMA actors to obtain firsthand verified data

ing and conducting initial practical discus-

humanitarian access issues, housing, land

from the ground and act as an initial phase of

sions between sides in a given context, as the

and property rights, or good governance.

the desk assessment.

topic of dealing with explosive munitions

Examples of HMA being successfully imple-

Used intelligently, open-source data could

contamination is relatively neutral and is

mented in peacebuilding initiatives have been

support different purposes outside of the

a problem that people often unanimously

seen in Armenia, Azerbaijan, Colombia, Sri

HMA sector as well. For the peacebuilding

agree needs solving. If successful, HMA and

Lanka, and Sudan.29

28

Conclusion
and donor entities a tool that helps contextu-

With the completion of The Carter Center’s

alize and appraise the scale and complexity of

project expected by the summer of 2021, 30 the

flict events, a detailed overview can illustrate

the issue of explosive weapons contamination

authors are actively seeking collaboration

the distribution of a variety of types of explosive

in an area, especially if used comparatively

with entities seeking to replicate or widen this

munitions in a given area. This can give actors

with other contexts. Not only limited to Syria,

scope of the project, especially in other

conducting initial desk-based assessments an

the project has strong potential in a number of

regions in the world. 31 We would also wel-

advantage if other methods are ineffective or

other locations around the world, such as Libya,

come any feedback about the project.

unavailable. This tool can be used to conduct a

Ukraine, and Yemen as well as in neighboring

The views expressed in this article do not

basic risk assessment for HMA actors, as well as

sectors such as peacebuilding. The authors

represent the authors’ current or previous

add to HMA actors’ ability to plan and prioritize

hope that this article encourages other entities

employers.

activities over a large area, such as NTS or RE

to replicate this study in the future with their

activities. At the strategic level, the granularity

own conflict data to supplement their existing

provided by this type of study can give political

methods or datasets.
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Human Rights Watch (HRW), Explosive Weapons Devastating Civilians: International Action Needed to Curtail Deaths, Long-Term Harm in
Populated Areas (Feb 2020). Accessed from https://bit.ly/3k8WuUu. on 1 May 2020.
Geneva International Center for Humanitarian De-mining (GICHD), Explosive Remnants of War (ERW) Definitions (Nov 2001). Accessed from
https://bit.ly/3z7MhM0.
Action on Armed Violence (AOAV), The Reverberating Effects of Explosive Weapon Use in Syria (Jan 2019), Page 4. Accessed from https://bit.
ly/2YTXiUY.
The Carter Center is a nongovernmental organization guided by the principles of Founders Jimmy and Rosalynn Carter. Founded in
partnership with Emory University, on a fundamental commitment to human rights and the alleviation of human suffering, The Carter
Center has helped to improve the lives of people in more than eighty countries by resolving conflicts, advancing democracy and human rights,
preventing diseases, and improving mental health.
The Explosive Munitions Use in Syria Project is run by the Syria Conflict Mapping Project, part of The Carter Center’s Conflict Resolution
Program on Supporting Peace in Syria.
As opposed to the common practice of counting the conflict event itself, which can contain multiple explosive munition uses.
The Carter Center, Explosive Weapons Contamination in Syria, Report 1; Southern Syria: As Sweida, Daraa and Quneitra Governorates (Nov
2019), The Carter Center, Explosive Weapons Contamination in Syria, Report 2; Damascus and Rural Damascus (Jan 2020), The Carter Center,
Explosive Weapons Contamination in Syria, Report 3: Northwest Syria: Aleppo, Idleb, and Latakia Governorates (Aug 2020), and The Carter
Center, Explosive Weapons Contamination in Syria, Report 4: Northeast Syria: Al Hassakeh, Ar Raqqa, and Deir Ez Zor Governorates (November
2020). Accessed from https://bit.ly/3Ecb05G and
Although it is understood that the data study alone cannot fully predict explosive weapons contamination as a variety of conditions are needed
for the formation of this such as firing conditions, weather, ground type and age of munitions (to name some).
These weapons types are general such as air launched, ground launched shelling, rather than specific weapons manufacturers. It is
also understood that a variety of factors contribute to the formation of explosive weapons contamination, not just where high levels of
bombardments have occurred.
The advantage of the study being that the distribution of explosive munitions is focused on rather than the exact number of items in it.
Given that it takes considerable time and effort to verify or confirm an event or munition use.
For example, the data from the project could identify and establish suspected hazardous areas (SHA) polygons which could then later be
entered in IMSMA and followed up by non-technical surveys.
As the project helps; 1) assist in raising awareness and prioritization of potential high risk areas of UXO contamination in Syria for risk
education, 2) assist with prioritizing areas for on the risk mitigation activities and ground surveys as part of the initial stage of mine action,
3) support advocacy efforts in the de-mining sector and donor levels, 4) bring together key decision makers from all sides of a conflict, 5)
highlight the need for an effective long term policy response and 6) contribute to reducing the threat posed by explosive munitions and the
lasting impact it has to people living in affected areas.
For example, IMMAP, The Mosul Dashboard: Explosive Incidents (Oct 2016). Accessed from https://bit.ly/3huWZGt.
For example, Humanity and Inclusion (HI), The Use of Explosive Weapons in Syria; A Time Bomb in the Making (May 2015). Accessed from
https://bit.ly/3ljXJPT.
The Carter Center’s reports explain more about the data used. See The Carter Center, Explosive Weapons Contamination in Syria, Report 2;
Damascus and Rural Damascus (Jan 2020), Page 3. Accessed from https://bit.ly/2YIOhOk.
For more details about this method, see The Carter Center, Explosive Weapons Contamination in Syria, Report 2; Damascus and Rural
Damascus (Jan 2020), Page 3 - 4. Accessed from https://bit.ly/3CapDF0.
Such as with the limited accuracy and trust of open source data, and the method likely under-counting the number of explosive munitions in a
given conflict event, especially if no exact number of munitions was given.
This is as detailed as the study goes. It does not specify the exact weapon type used or manufacturer. For more information please see the
aforementioned Carter Center reports.
The study was presented to members of the UNMAS Humanitarian Mine Action Syria Working Group in Amman on 15 September 2019
after being invited to do so. This built on a proof of concept study focused on Eastern Ghouta and in Yemen in 2018 conducted by one of the
authors. In addition, at least 8 HMA actors focused on Syria have expressed interest in using the findings and method of the project for their
work in Syria. Two HMA actors are currently testing the validity of the findings in their activities on the ground, while one has built in the
method outlined in this project to enhance their own desk assessment process.
The advantage of the study being that the distribution of explosive munitions is focused on rather than the exact number of items in it.
Map from The Carter Center, Explosive Weapons Contamination in Syria, Report 1; Southern Syria: As Sweida, Daraa and Quneitra
Governorates (Nov 2019), Accessed from https://bit.ly/2XcJvbH.
A reasonable assumption based on previous studies such as RAND Corporation, Unexploded Ordnance Clean Up Costs; Implications of
Alternative Protocols, (2005), Accessed from https://bit.ly/3npvIZX.
With this count likely much higher given the limitations of the data, methodology and way UXO is formed.
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25. Partly available from open sources.
26. This is in addition to various issues such as lack of international appetite for funding in government areas of Syria, sanctions and terrorism laws
applied to Syria, and limited access into the country and within for entities that conduct de-mining.
27. Such as Ukraine, Libya or in Yemen, where one of the authors conducted a pilot version of the explosive munitions project with Halo Trust in
late 2018.
28. As The Carter Center did in January 2020 and mentioned in the following source The Carter Center, Using Conflict Data to Help Demining
Efforts in Syria (Aug 2020), Accessed from https://www.cartercenter.org/news/features/p/conflict_resolution/using-conflict-data-for-deminingin-syria.html on 30 January 2021.
29. This often underutilized field was developed in the early 2000s from contexts in the 1990s, before being further enhanced in the mid 2010s.
Two key reports on this topic that contains numerous examples of HMA being used in peacebuilding are 1) Geneva International Center for
Humanitarian De-mining (GICHD), Mine Action and Mediation (Oct 2016). Accessed from https://bit.ly/3ht2s0m 2) International Peace
Research Institute (PIRO), Preparing the Ground for Peace – Mine Action in Support of Peace Building (Feb 2004). Accessed from https://bit.
ly/3lkFUAb.
30. The completed project will span five reports and visualize and analyze a dataset of hundreds of thousands of explosive munitions uses
extrapolated from tens of thousands of conflict events. This will cover thousands of communities in the 14 governorates of Syria from July
2013 until the present day. This data will be freely available from The Carter Center Syria Program on request. The Carter Center is expected to
regularly update the dataset in the future as part of a routine maintenance of the project to keep it relevant.
31. They are currently seeking to develop a pilot project in Ukraine, develop other information layers to be used in the project as well as its wider
use in the peacebuilding sector.
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